

Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture

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Indian strategic culture has manifold influences and one such is the thinker Kautilya. This article discusses the teachings of Kautilya as compiled in his book The Arthashastra and argues that his ideas are important for the understanding of Indian strategic culture. While history shows his teachings were popular amongst statesmen, it is in independent India's policies that one sees a manifestation of Kautilyan thinking and the article calls for a thorough reading of The Arthashastra as India becomes a key player in international politics.

Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom.

— Jawaharlal Nehru¹

India woke up to life and freedom on 15 August 1947 when the British Empire folded after 190 years of imperial rule. In spite of its manifold problems, not least being the traumatic experience of the partition of the Indian subcontinent, at that particular juncture it seemed that India truly was destined to achieve greatness. But the future did not turn out to be as expected, and until the 1990s India seemed to remain a big Third World country mired in insurmountable problems and suffering from a low “Hindu rate of growth.” To paraphrase Charles de Gaulle, India had great potential and it always would.

The early 1990s saw India facing a massive economic crisis that forced the country to initiate economic reforms and embrace liberal economic policies. Since then India has been on the rise. A sustained GDP growth rate hovering between 6.5 to 8 percent has been the norm for the Indian economy. The size of the economy more than doubled during the period from 1991 to 2000, to over \$500 billion, making India the tenth largest economy in the world and the fourth largest in terms of purchasing-power parity (PPP).² India's rising economic clout is acknowledged by the presence of Indian delegates at exclusive economic conferences such as the G8 summit meetings and small, but influential, group consultations in various international economic organizations. Indeed, it is not only the governments of the developed economies of the world that are paying attention to India's rise. Big independent players in the global economic field also are eyeing India favorably. India, according to Goldman Sachs, is one of the “BRIC” countries (the acronym stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China) that over the next fifty years are expected to become a much larger force in the world economy. If things go right, in less than forty years these economies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms.³

But it is not only in the economic sphere that India is making waves. Militarily, India has made tremendous strides in the past few decades and today it is a military power that

has to be taken seriously. The Indian Army is a well-trained million-man force equipped with Russian T-90 and T-72 main battle tanks. Given India's world-class scientific and technological prowess, it is no surprise that the Army also is equipped with indigenously built Arjun and Vijayanta main battle tanks. With its Russian and French aircraft, the Indian Air Force also is a potent force. Simulated combat trials in recent years between US F-15s and Indian SU-30s have left the Indians clear winners.⁴

In addition to these developments, it needs to be kept in mind that India possesses not only nuclear weapons but also effective delivery systems in the shape of various short and middle range missiles. However, the real thrust of India's military might cannot be fully gauged without looking at the changes that the Indian Navy is undergoing. In 2004 India tripled its naval spending to 18 percent of the defense budget, reflecting the new emphasis on quickly deploying an ocean-going fleet. This increase in budgetary allocation reportedly allowed India to spend \$1 billion on a top-secret project to build a nuclear-powered submarine euphemistically called the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) and \$2.5 billion to buy the 44,500 ton ex-Soviet carrier Admiral Gorshkov and four Tu-22M long-range naval bombers/strike aircraft from Russia.⁵ In addition to plans for leasing (with the ultimate objective of buying) two Type 971 Akula-class nuclear powered submarines from Russia, in September 2005 India ordered six highly advanced Scorpene diesel submarines from France at an estimated cost of \$3 billion.⁶

Changes also are manifest in the way of Indian Navy's self-perception. In April 2004, it released a new Indian Maritime Doctrine. The document sees the Indian Navy shifting away from its earlier defensive doctrine centered on coastal protection to an aggressively competitive strategy which strives for developing a credible minimum nuclear deterrence (MND), pursuing littoral warfare and dominating the Indian Ocean region. It portrays a vision of the Indian Navy endeavoring to project power through "reach, multiplied by sustainability" across its "legitimate areas of interest" stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits.⁷ Interestingly, while the naval doctrine presents a new vision of India, observers of the Indian Navy are well aware that India has been harboring such ambitions for some time now. Perhaps the vindication of India's newfound role came well before the announcement of the doctrine, when, between March and September 2002, two Indian naval patrol vessels, INS Sharada and INS Sukanya, escorted high-value ships flying the U.S. flag in the Malacca Straits and the Andaman and South China Seas.⁸

As India raises her profile economically and militarily, it is natural she will play a more important role in world politics. This is where strategists and defence analysts come in. In order to understand India's growing ambition, it is imperative to have a clear understanding of Indian strategic culture. What are the influences driving India forward? Why have Indian policymakers decided on their current course? A word of caution about strategic culture is in order before we proceed further along the road in our quest to understand Indian strategic culture. The concept of culture has seen a lot of ink spilled over its definition and parameters.⁹ In this article we will adhere to the following definition of strategic culture: "Strategic culture consists of the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions, habits of mind, traditions and preferred methods of operation—that is behavior—that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community."¹⁰ Indian strategic culture therefore refers to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derived from perception of national historical experience, self-characterization (e.g., as an Indian, what am I?, how should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively Indian experiences (of geography, political philosophy, civic culture and "way of life") that characterize an Indian citizen.¹¹ We propose that, amongst other influencing factors, Indian strategic culture is influenced by the ideas of Kautilya codified in his book *The*

Arthashastra.¹² Thus, for anyone interested in discerning the nature of Indian thinking with regard to the use of force to attain policy objectives, Kautilya is an interesting figure who must be studied thoroughly. That is the purpose of this essay.

The article will first, therefore, deal with Kautilya himself. Who was Kautilya? Did he really exist? Was *The Arthashastra* written by him? These questions will be dealt with in the first section of the article. The second section highlights the teachings of Kautilya with regard to strategic studies. *The Arthashastra* discusses topics ranging from taxation of goods to punishment for deviant sexual behavior, but for the purposes at hand it is important that the relevant sections which would help us understand Indian strategic behavior be teased out from the book. Subsequently, the influence of Kautilya on Indian strategic thinking will be gauged. The article will examine various periods of Indian history and see what, if any, influence Kautilya's teachings had on policies and events. The conclusion discusses the relevance of Kautilya in present day India and what this means for non-Indian policy planners.

Kautilya: The Man and the Myth

Any discussion of Kautilya must confront the fact that doubts have been voiced over the years concerning whether he actually wrote *The Arthashastra*, and, indeed, whether he even existed. This section examines these controversies, but argues both that Kautilya did exist and that *The Arthashastra* was his contribution to Indian strategic thinking.

In our search for Kautilya we have to go back to one of the defining moments of Indian history: the invasion of northwestern India by Alexander the Great in 327 B.C. Historians tell us that Alexander crossed over into India in the middle of that year. Delayed by fighting against various tribes in present-day northern Pakistan, he only crossed the river Indus in February 326 B.C. At the battle of Hydaspes (Jhelum River), Alexander fought and defeated King Poros. It is claimed some 20,000 enemy troops were killed by Alexander's men in this hard-fought battle. Even though Poros finally accepted Alexander's suzerainty and was made an ally, the Battle of Hydaspes marked the end of Alexander's attempt to conquer the world. His troops, wearied by eight years of incessant fighting, the ferocity of the Indian monsoon, and stories of more kings commanding big armies equipped with war elephants, refused to cross the Hyphasis (the Beas River, which is east of the city of Lahore in present-day Pakistan). Alexander was forced to turn back, leaving Greek outposts in the occupied Indian territories.¹³

Indian sources, including *The Arthashastra*, make little note of Alexander's invasion of India. To the authors of these sources, most likely, he was one of the innumerable conquerors of the northwest who had entered India in an endless sequence of raids from time immemorial. But it must be noted that Alexander's invasion had an important indirect impact on Indian history.¹⁴ Though the Greek outposts left in India were soon lost, contacts remained between Alexander's successors and their Indian counterparts. An important result of such contact was the report of Seleukos Nikator's ambassador Megasthenes, stationed at the court of Chandragupta Maurya. It was Megasthenes' report on India which remained one of the most important sources of knowledge about the region for Western scholars until the arrival of Europeans in India in the fifteenth century. Secondly, the Hellenistic successor states that were established in northwest India (mostly in present-day eastern Afghanistan) had a profound influence on the development of Indian art. But it is the third indirect impact of Alexander's invasion that is most relevant for our discussion of Kautilya. The resulting anarchy and chaos brought about by Alexander's thrust into that part of India launched the career of Chandragupta Maurya, who subsequently laid the foundations of the Mauryan Empire, which at its zenith was rivaled only by the Mughal and, later, the British Empire of India.

The early career of Chandragupta Maurya is shrouded in mist. Some believe he started his military career fighting against the Greek outposts that Alexander had established along the river Indus. After bringing them under his control, he extended his power eastwards and in 320 B.C. defeated King Dhana Nanda and occupied the throne of Magadha.¹⁵ At this point we should make one important point about the Nanda king who reigned in Magadha (located in present day Bihar, India). When Alexander's troops refused to proceed further eastwards after the defeat of King Poros, one reason for this intransigence may well have been the rumours they heard about the powerful king who was waiting for them in the interior of India. It is said he had a powerful standing army of 200,000 infantrymen, 20,000 horsemen, 2,000 chariots drawn by four horses each, and 3,000 elephants.¹⁶ While there is an air of exaggeration about these numbers, they do convey a sense of the might of Dhana Nanda. That Chandragupta could defeat him and occupy his throne was certainly no small feat.

Sources vary concerning the early life of Chandragupta. Classical sources speak of a young Indian named Sandrocottus (the Chandragupta of Indian sources) who sided with the Greeks. Plutarch states that Sandrocottus advised Alexander to advance beyond the Beas and attack Nanda territory. Given the fact that Dhana Nanda was very unpopular, it was inevitable that his subjects would rise in support of an invader. The Latin historian Justin adds that Sandrocottus later offended Alexander by the boldness of his speech and was condemned to death. Sandrocottus escaped, and after many adventures succeeded in expelling the Greek garrisons and gaining the throne of India.¹⁷

Whether Chandragupta was involved with Alexander or started his career fighting and subduing the Greek outposts and eventually conquering Magadha, it is certain that he was the architect of a truly great Indian empire. More importantly, in this endeavor he was advised and aided by a very able and unscrupulous Brahman adviser variously called Kautilya, Chanakya, and Visnugupta.¹⁸ In fact Kautilya is one of the very few historical figures who have been immortalized in Indian poetry. He is present in *The Mudraraksasa* (The Minister's Signet Ring), a play of seven acts by Viskhadatta (of the fifth, eighth or ninth century A.D.). The play centers around the defeat of the Nanda dynasty by Kautilya and his winning over the Nanda chancellor Raksasa to the cause of his own royal protégé, Chandragupta.¹⁹

Notwithstanding the insistence of all Indian sources on Kautilya playing the most important role in ensuring Chandragupta's consolidation of power and the literary evidence for Kautilya's existence, doubts nonetheless have been voiced about both Kautilya and his magnum opus. Ever since the latter text was discovered by Dr. R. Shamasastri of Mysore in 1904 and published in 1909 (the English translation came out in 1915), questions have been asked about both the man himself and his work. Many consider *The Arthashastra* to be a piece of literary forgery from about the third century A.D.; doubts also have been voiced over whether Kautilya really existed.²⁰ Three main contentions have been used to support these contentions:²¹

- i) In his *Mahabhashya*, Patanjali mentions Chandragupta and the Mauryas but is silent about Kautilya;
- ii) Even though Megasthenes wrote about the Maurya dynasty, especially about their magnificent capital city and also about the seven strata of Indian society, he never mentioned Kautilya; and
- iii) *The Arthashastra* was not written by Kautilya but is most likely a compilation of various texts and ideas of the old. The compilation was probably done by scores of individuals rather than one single person.

Supporters of the view that Kautilya was an actual historical figure have responded strongly to these allegations. They argue that Patanjali's *Mahabhashya* is not the history of *The Arthashastra* and that, just as its failure to mention Vedic texts does not prove their nonexistence, the fact that there is no mention of Kautilya's work should not be taken as evidence of its nonexistence.²² As for Megasthenes and his silence about Kautilya, the pro-Kautilya scholars point out that Megasthenes' *Indika* is not available in its entirety; only a few fragments in the writing of later Greek historians are known. Hence the fact that the few surviving passages do not contain Kautilya's name should not lead us to conclude that he was never mentioned anywhere in the complete text.²³ Scholars cite sections of Megasthenes' description of the capital of Chandragupta and relate it to Kautilya's injunction on building fortifications. Megasthenes reported that the city was fortified with palisades. The fortification was shaped like a parallelogram measuring about 9 miles in length and about 1.5 miles in breadth. It consisted of 570 towers and 64 gates and it has been established that the distances between the towers or between a tower and the next gate as derived from Megasthenes' account closely correspond to the distance prescribed for this kind of fortification by Kautilya in *The Arthashastra*.²⁴ Moreover, it can also be pointed out that Kautilya was a contemporary of Alexander. The various references made in *The Arthashastra* about the march of the world conqueror bear a striking resemblance to Alexander's campaign strategy.²⁵

The allegation that *The Arthashastra* was not written by Kautilya, but rather is a compilation, is the most serious and deserves to be discussed in some detail. In fairness to Kautilya it must be pointed out that he was not the originator of the science of politics and he himself acknowledges that his work is based on similar treatises of the past.²⁶ Going through his work one can identify one hundred and twelve places in the text where earlier authorities and their works are mentioned.²⁷ Thus, one can deduce that the kind of knowledge addressed in Kautilya's writings were present in India in the ages before him. With regard to whether *The Arthashastra* was a compilation, most likely created by disciples of Kautilya rather than the man himself, one must understand that, given the persistent tradition of oral transmission in India, it is most likely that even if later disciples did compile the teachings of Kautilya, this compilation would not materially differ from what was known to be the teaching of the founder.²⁸ The debate over Kautilya and his work can be continued endlessly, but it would be logical to deduce from the evidence presented above that Kautilya was the main author of this famous text and that he lived around 300 B.C. To this the qualification may be added that parts of the text are later additions and revisions, some of which may have been made as late as 300 A.D.²⁹ *The Arthashastra* is the finest, fullest and most cogently reasoned Sanskrit treatise on the subject of statecraft³⁰ and it is imperative for us to now turn to the book itself and see what Kautilya has to offer us.

Kautilya's Teachings

The word *artha* has a variety of meanings, but the literal meaning of *The Arthashastra*, in the way Kautilya uses it, is the Science of Polity. The objective of this science is to lay bare the study of politics, wealth and practical expediency, of ways of acquiring and maintaining power.³¹ Thus the subjects covered by Kautilya include: administration; law, order and justice; taxation, revenue and expenditure; foreign policy; and defense and war. The purpose of studying all these matters was to realize three interrelated objectives: promotion of welfare of the subjects, which leads to acquisition of wealth, which in turn makes it possible to enlarge one's territory by conquest.³²

Given Kautilya's objectives and methods of acquiring, we should not be surprised to see that *The Arthashastra* consists of three distinct parts: administration; law and justice, and foreign policy. Each manual lays down in depth what should be done to attain the desired objectives. While a serious reader of *The Arthashastra* is assured of finding countless gems of wisdom in the three manuals, for the purpose of this article we have to limit our focus only on the foreign policy aspect of the book. As stated at the beginning of the essay, we aim to see if and how Kautilya's ideas pertaining to foreign policy, i.e. enlargement of territory by conquest or, in today's terms, enlargement of a sphere of interest, are used by Indian strategists today. We take this opportunity to remind the reader that Kautilya was writing at a time when the Indian subcontinent had recently experienced Alexander the Great's invasion of its northwest. Though Alexander was not able to influence events as profoundly as he had in other parts of Asia and Africa, he nevertheless must have been aware of the turbulence caused by this foray. Invasion, sometimes violent competition among various small polities, and anarchy was the context in which Kautilya set to write his ideas and make Chandragupta a great king. Thus, *The Arthashastra* is not only about effectively running a great empire but also about creating one in a chaotic period.

At the center of all Kautilya's attention is the *vijigishu* (the king desirous of fresh conquests). Kautilya's objective is to make the *vijigishu* a *chakravartin* (universal monarch who can put an end to the perpetual struggle of the contending states and lead his army to the farthest horizon unchallenged).³³ How Kautilya planned to achieve this strategic objective and its implications for India and the world today are discussed in the following pages.

The world facing the *vijigishu* is one of disorder, anarchy and chaos. It is full of danger and everyone, including neighboring kings, the *vijigishu*'s own sons or relatives, ministers and generals, is always on the prowl, looking for the slightest chink in the defenses, the flimsiest of opportunities to overthrow the *vijigishu*. It is these dangers on the home front that compel Kautilya to place a very strong emphasis on the use of spies and espionage. However, that is not our concern in this essay. Rather it is the threat of external enemies and how to neutralize them that draws our attention. Given the absence of an overriding international body of law that ensures every king's right to exist, irrespective of size, the *vijigishu* is truly living in a system of *matsya-nyaya*, "the law of the fish" where "the big ones eat the little ones," a system in which it is every man for himself. Because size enhances security, the objective is to consolidate one's strength at the expense of other powers.³⁴

For the *vijigishu* to survive in the *matsya-nyaya* system and ultimately become a *chakravartin* it is imperative he understand his position in the *mandala* system of states. Kautilya was not the first Indian thinker to talk about the *mandala*. In fact, mention of the *mandala* system is to be found in several ancient texts such as the *Mahabharata*, *Manu*, and *Agnipurana*, but Kautilya probably is the first thinker to systematize the theory and write elaborately on it.³⁵ So what is the *mandala* and where does the *vijigishu* fit in the scheme of things? The *mandala* literally means a circle with a center or nucleus, which in this case is the *vijigishu*.³⁶ The *mandala* is based on the geopolitical assumption that the *vijigishu* is at the centre of *mandala* and his immediate neighbor state is most likely an *ari* or enemy (real or potential) and the state next to the immediate neighbor, by the same logic pervading the *mandala*, the enemy of the immediate neighbor is likely to the *vijigishu*'s *mitra* or friend. After the friendly or *mitra* state comes an unfriendly state (*Ari-mitra* or friend of the enemy state) and next to that a friendly state (*Mitra-mitra* or friend of a friendly state) and so on. The rear neighbor is called the *parshnigraha*, which may seize or attack the *vijigishu* from behind. This is really an *ari*, or enemy, but usually such a state waits until the *vijigishu* has started offensive against the *ari* or frontal neighbor and then attacks from the rear. Behind

the *parshnigraha* is a rather friendly state, called *akranda*, which helps the *vijigishu* when a request for assistance is made. Immediately after the *akranda* is the friend of the *parshnigraha*. This is called the *parshnigrahasara*, which also is an enemy state. Adjacent to this is *akrandasara*, a friendly state, and so on.

The sheer complexity of Kautilya's *mandala* system does not end here. There are two other actors who play important roles in the *mandala* and the *vijigishu* must always keep them in mind, lest they adversely affect his ambition. These are *madhyama* (the middle kingdom) and *udasina* (the neutral kingdom). The *madhyama* state is situated on the borders of both the *vijigishu* and the *ari* and is capable of helping either. The *udasina* is located beyond the territory of both the *vijigishu* and the *ari*, is very powerful and capable of helping the *vijigishu*, the *ari* and the *madhyama* states together or individually, or of resisting any of them individually.

It should be noted that all the states in the *mandala* system face the same predicament: they are surrounded by a ring of allies and enemies, middle states and indifferent neutral powers. Thus, the *mandala* system is a very fluid one in which relationships constantly are being interpreted and reinterpreted, thereby creating opportunities for some actors and exposing others to danger. Under such circumstances only the wise ruler can achieve success and Kautilya advises in *The Arthashastra* as to how this is to be done. For Kautilya, the only way the *vijigishu* can attain success in the *mandala* system operating under the conditions of *matsya-nyaya* is by following the *shadgunya* (six-fold) policy. This consists of six foreign policy methods that the *vijigishu* uses to achieve his goals. The *shadgunya* policy consists of *sandhi*, *vigraha*, *asana*, *yana*, *samshraya*, and *dvaidhibhava*. Kautilya explained the methods as follows :

- (i) *Sandhi* (peace): "Whoever is inferior to another shall make peace (with him)."
- (ii) *Vigraha* (war): "Whoever is superior in power shall make war."
- (iii) *Asana* (neutrality): "Whoever thinks 'No enemy can hurt me, or am I strong enough to destroy my enemy' shall observe neutrality."
- (iv) *Yana* (march): "Whoever is possessed of necessary means shall march against his enemy."
- (v) *Samshraya* (seeking alliance or shelter): "Whoever is devoid of necessary strength to defend himself shall seek the protection of another."
- (vi) *Dvaidhibhava* (double policy): "Whoever thinks that help is necessary to work out an end shall make peace with one and wage war with another."

While the methods are self-explanatory in most cases, it would be helpful if we clarify some of the questions a reader might ask concerning the various methods. *Sandhi* signifies an agreement with pledges. Kautilya maintains that when the advantages derivable from peace and war are equal, one should prefer peace as war is full of uncertainties and can cause massive losses. Peace can be achieved through various means, but it should be remembered that it is only temporary and is part of a broader policy of lulling the enemy into complacency. Kautilya is much clearer about *vigraha*, or war. When the situation is conducive then the *vijigishu* should go for war. Three types of war are identified by Kautilya: *prakashayudda* (open war), a battle in the normal sense; *kutayudda* (treacherous war), a war where the enemy is attacked in a variety of ways, surprise attacks being the norm; and, *tusniyudda* (secret war), which involves attacking the enemy using secret agents and occult devices.

The third and the fourth methods mentioned by Kautilya in the *shadgunya* policy might confuse the reader. Let us deal with *asana*, or neutrality, first. For Kautilya, neutrality can be defined as indifference or inactivity; it is guided by self-interest. It is to be noted that the policy of neutrality is a pragmatic one and changes with the circumstances. *The Arthashastra*

identifies three aspects of neutrality: *sthana* (keeping quiet), *asana* (withdrawal from hostility), and *upekshana* (negligence or taking no strategic steps). Kautilya defines the fourth method, *yana*, or march, as making preparation for war. However, *yana* should not be seen as an irrevocable step to war; it can be used to compel the enemy into submission without actual fighting.

The last two of the six methods are *samshraya* and *dvaidhibhava*. The word *samshraya* literally means support. When the king is not able to defend his state from an enemy's wrath then he is to adhere to this method, for only alliance with and protection from a superior power can help him overcome this danger. The final method, *dvaidhibhava*, sometimes is interpreted as making peace with a neighboring king in order to pursue, with his help, hostility toward a third party.³⁷ But it should be kept in mind that in Kautilya's scheme of things, peace with a neighbour is only a temporary expedient; eventually, conflict with that neighbor is inevitable. Under such circumstances it is more useful to explain *dvaidhibhava* as a policy of diplomatically inducing confidence in enemies but behaving aggressively in secret.³⁸

The Arthashastra presents the *vijigishu* with the *shadgunya* (six-fold) policy and expects the ruler to use whichever methods are suitable in a given situation. But it is to be noted that Kautilya realises that the *shadgunya* methods are effective only if they are implemented through various instruments, means or *upaya* (influence techniques). In *The Arthashastra*, references to these influence techniques are less frequent and less systematic than are those to the six-fold policy. They are scattered throughout the book in various chapters.³⁹ Opinions also vary about the number of instruments, or *upayas*. Thus George Modelski refers to four instruments: *sama* (conciliation), *dana* (gift), *bheda* (dissension), and *danda* (punishment).⁴⁰ Zimmer agrees that there are four main instruments, but adds three additional ones: *maya* (deceit), *upeksa* (indifference), and *indrajala* (magic or trickery in war).⁴¹ M. V. Krishna Rao tends to side with Heinrich Zimmer,⁴² while Imtiaz Ahmed lists five, broadly describing them as:

- (i) *Sama* (conciliation): The ruler must attempt conciliation when success in a dangerous situation is unlikely.
- (ii) *Dana* (gift): The policy of *dana* is to be applied to inferior kings and discontented people with the avowed purpose of winning them without bloodshed.
- (iii) *Bheda* (dissension): If *dana* fail to do their work then the policy of "sowing the seeds of dissension" is to be followed. The primary purpose is to create chaos and confusion amongst the enemies and neutralize their threat.
- (iv) *Maya-Indrajala* (deceit and pretence): The ruler could undertake certain tactical manoeuvres to outsmart the enemy. This could range from the use of nonaggression pacts or treaties to lull the enemy to the policies of wearing a mask of moral probity, religious righteousness or citing moral righteousness to mask one's intentions and attain them through deceit and pretence.
- (v) *Danda* (open attack or war): If all the above instruments fail to contain the enemy then the policy of coercion or open attack is to be undertaken. However, since war is a serious matter it is not to be undertaken in haste but is to be pursued only after careful consideration of the enemy's financial condition and the level of popular support which the enemy enjoys.⁴³

Any serious reader of Kautilya will undoubtedly benefit from a thorough study of *The Arthashastra*. This essay, so far, has attempted to describe Kautilya's writings with regard to foreign policy. But an important question remains to be answered. Does a book purportedly written nearly two millennia ago still have any relevance for understanding Indian strategic

culture? Is Kautilya in any way able to influence the behavior of present-day Indian policy-makers in strategic matters? It is to these questions that we now turn.

Relevance of Kautilya

Any discussion on the relevance of Kautilya immediately faces two obstacles and they have to be overcome if any meaningful and logical answer can be given to the question. These are demonstrating, first, the usefulness of Kautilya's teachings in today's India, which is so different from the time of Mauryas and, second, that Kautilya's cold, cynical, and ruthless teachings have any sway in an India whose dominant image to the world is that it is the land of Buddha, Ashoka and Gandhi, apostles and practitioners of nonviolence whose main foreign policy pillars appear to be nonalignment, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Let us deal with the second matter first.

The usual image that comes to the mind when India is mentioned is that of a peace-loving country whose inhabitants are influenced strongly by the concept of nonviolence and illustrious practitioners including Gautama Buddha, Ashoka (the third Mauryan emperor), and the architect of free India, Mahatma Gandhi. But a critical observer of Indian history will notice that this idea of a nonviolent society that abhors war and bloodshed is a myth of sorts that has been carefully constructed and sustained throughout the ages. Let us turn our attention to Ashoka.

Ashoka was the grandson of Chandragupta Maurya, the aforementioned royal protégé of Kautilya. Ashoka reigned from 268 to 233 B.C. and under him the empire reached its zenith. But it is not for ruling over such a vast polity that Ashoka is famous today. Rather, he is fondly remembered for his espousal of Buddhism and nonviolence. In the seventh year of his reign (261 B.C.), Ashoka decided to make an addition to the conquests of his illustrious predecessors and attacked Kalinga. After seeing the result of his aggression against Kalinga, a war which brought the latter into the Mauryan empire at the cost of one hundred thousand deaths and the deportation of one hundred and fifty thousand people, Ashoka took up Buddhism, renounced war and bloodshed and decided to attain further conquests only through spiritual means. Among other methods, he supported missionary activity and erected rock edicts and pillars which preached the importance of nonviolence. Among other achievements, Ashoka is credited with the spread of Buddhism in east and southeast Asia and rightly is honored today as one of India's greatest rulers. Indeed, the Republic of India selected one of Ashoka's pillars, the lion pillar, as the emblem of the state.

While the benevolent acts of Ashoka should not be dismissed, it appears that the teachings of Kautilya were never far from the mind of the emperor. Basham tells us that Ashoka constantly was troubled by wild tribes living on his imperial frontiers and was quite ready to deal forcefully with them if they continued their ravages. While adhering to Buddhism and its creed of nonviolence, Ashoka did not demobilize his army. As for Kalinga, Ashoka did not give it up or restore it to its original rulers. Kalinga was governed as an integral part of the empire. It is true that there were no military conquests after Kalinga, but perhaps this was because Kalinga marked the end of Aryan India and the non-Aryan part was not to be conquered for religious and social reasons. It seems that Kautilya is operating very much in Ashokan India; A. L. Basham comes to the conclusion that Ashoka by no means gave up his imperial ambitions, but modified them in accordance with the humanitarian ethics of Buddhism.⁴⁴

The Buddhist kings who later ruled over large parts of India were also no different from Ashoka: thus Harsha, Dharmapala, or Devapala were no less warlike than the Mauryas and Guptas. Nirad C. Chaudhuri observed that twenty-five words found in an Ashokan

inscription promoting nonviolence have succeeded in almost wholly suppressing the thousands in the rest of the epigraphy and the whole of Sanskrit literature which bear testimony to the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus and reminds us that few communities have been more warlike and fond of bloodshed.⁴⁵ So much for the myth of an ancient India practising nonviolence and emphasizing the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Moving to modern times, it should be understood that Mahatma Gandhi's presence and role in the birth of modern India does not in any way mean the total denial of violence as a tool in dealing with India's international relations. Any idea that Gandhi was totally opposed to the idea of the use of force or violence is safely dispelled when we come to know that Gandhi was not averse to the use of violence to ensure India's territorial integrity, even if that is a contested one. Thus W. P. S. Sidhu reminds us that, speaking with Pakistan in mind, Gandhi firmly declared that if given the choice between cowardice and violence, the latter is to be preferred. Gandhi, that apostle of nonviolence, was willing to have India resort to the use of force to protect her honor rather than be dishonoured.⁴⁶

Even as we realize that far from being a country of peace loving and nonviolence, India has been a country whose political history has been written in blood-stained pages, the question remains as to whether a text written nearly two thousand years ago has any relevance for India today. We will now try to see if Kautilya's thought influences present Indian strategic culture, and empirical evidence about Kautilya's relevance will be provided subsequently. While many sources of strategic culture are present, proponents of this concept have agreed that key texts are important in informing actors of appropriate strategic thought and action.⁴⁷

Various societies throughout the world practice the art of reinterpreting the past to bring it in conformity with present beliefs and practices. One recent study on Greek strategic culture argues that ancient Greek texts like *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* still influence Greek strategic thinking. Thus, there are the "traditionalists," who derive their intellectual sustenance from their exploits of Achilles, hero of *The Iliad*. They see the world as an anarchic arena where power is the ultimate guarantee of security. On the other hand, there are the "modernists," followers of Odysseus, the hero of Homer's epic *The Odyssey*, who, although viewing the world as an anarchic environment, consider Greece's best strategy to be adopting a multilateral cooperative approach to peace and security.⁴⁸ Indians, being the proud heirs to one of the world's oldest civilizations, are not exempt from the influence of history. Indeed, Myron Weiner observes that ideas present in political texts like *The Arthashastra* and *Dharmashastras* are important. He traces their origins to India's hierarchical social structure and the country's religious beliefs, both of which are very much present today and contends that it would be surprising if these ideas were totally at variance with contemporary beliefs and behaviour. All this leads Weiner to the conclusion that contemporary Indians are more akin to their ancestors in some respects than they are to their foreign contemporaries.⁴⁹ Coupled with the strong influences of societal structure and religious beliefs, yet another aspect of the Indian tradition also strengthens the chances of Kautilya's teachings playing an important role in present-day India. This is the oral tradition of dissemination of knowledge and it is to be noted that this tradition plays a significant role in today's Indian society. Refuting the usual Western complaints that India lacks a clear strategic tradition, Sidhu points out that not only were traditions, norms, law books and military strategies passed on by word of mouth for several centuries but also that Indians knew their history well and lived it every day. Thus, ideas espoused by Kautilya, especially the concept of realism, not only were relevant for Chandragupta Maurya but also for people such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.⁵⁰

While the above discussion serves to strengthen the conviction that Kautilya's ideas indeed are relevant in today's India, we can only dispel the doubts pertaining to his validity by empirical examples of his teaching being practiced. This is exactly what we propose to do in the remaining portion of the essay. We will start by looking at the role played by Kautilya in medieval India. But it is in the post-1947 India that we will really see the effective usage of Kautilya. Thus that era will be studied in some detail and we conclude by looking at the contemporary and future relevance of Kautilya in influencing Indian strategic culture.

Students of Indian history are aware that by the beginning of the first millennium A.D. a series of Muslim invasions of northern India commenced. The devastating raids between 1000 and 1027 A.D. by Mahmud of Ghazni were followed by those of the rulers of Ghur, and by 1192 A.D. Muslim rule was established in India. Why were these invaders able to continue their forays into India with impunity year after year? Why were Indian kings and princes unwilling to join together and resist the invaders? Surely, the advantages possessed by the invaders could have been neutralized if the Indians had mobilized all their resources and coordinated their efforts to resist the invaders. One reason for this failure might be the teachings of Kautilya. Joel Larus forcefully argues this point. He asserts that the Rajput clans and kingdoms located in northern India, and thus directly in the path of the invaders, were influenced by Kautilya's philosophy of peace and war.⁵¹ Given Kautilya's advocacy of a highly utilitarian, amoral approach to interstate relations, exemplified by the *matsya-nyaya*, *mandala* and *shadgunya* concepts, aggression by Hindu kings was all but continuous. For all the Indian kings, a neighboring king, whether an ally or neutral, was likely to be an implacable enemy as soon as he acquired sufficient strength to upset the status quo. Aggrandizement was perceived to be a duty of the king and how he acquired power was not of much concern. As a result, conflict among them was the norm and a joint front against the enemy was never possible. Thus *The Arthashastra* not only prescribed political-military behavior in medieval India, but Kautilyan philosophy became the model for relations among local states with disastrous consequences.⁵²

Yet, while medieval India certainly was influenced by Kautilyan ideas, it is really in independent India that we see the implementation of Kautilyan policies. We now will focus on independent India's foreign policy and try to discern the influence of Kautilyan tradition on it. It is interesting to note that in post-1947 India, references to Kautilya's work are scant. Even though Prime Minister Nehru did at one time write under the pseudonym "Chanakya," there were no mentions of Kautilya in his speeches.⁵³ However, Ashok Kapur has pointed out that Nehru did develop a strategy similar to Kautilya's *mandala* or "circle of states" system.⁵⁴ Given India's friendly relations with countries like Afghanistan, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and its enmity with Pakistan and China, it seems that Nehru did understand the utility of Kautilyan ideas. Moreover, at least one senior Indian diplomat, K. P. S. Menon, noted in 1947 that the "realism of Kautilya is a useful corrective to our idealism in international politics."⁵⁵ This understanding of the utility of Kautilyan thinking becomes much more significant when one traces the rhetoric of Indian policies and their actual implementation.

From the very beginning, Nehru, who was preeminent in formulating India's foreign and security policies, successfully presented to the world the image of a distinct Indian policy with regard to international relations. It was a policy where morality played a more prominent role than did the use of force. In this policy of nonalignment, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and the peaceful settlement of disputes were the key instruments by which world peace was to be attained. Even as late as 1960, Nehru reiterated that India's policy was rooted in these elements rather than purely military thinking.⁵⁶ The traditional and

widely accepted view is that it was Mahatma Gandhi's influence and legacy that propelled Nehru and India into this posture. But that proposition is difficult to accept, given that we have already seen how Gandhi himself was not always averse to "realist thinking." More significantly, it has been pointed out that Gandhi's philosophy and preferences had few adherents in India after his death in 1948. Hugh Tinker argues that though the philosophy of nonalignment, or "positive neutralism," was derived directly from Gandhian teaching, in reality, neutralism has been most convincing in inverse ratio to the direct involvement of Indian interests.⁵⁷ But it was in the policy of peaceful coexistence, or *ahimsa* (nonviolence), in which the contradiction between policy announcements and actions taken by India comes out most strongly. Lorne Kavic points out that while the Gandhian creed of nonviolence was praised, the Indian prime minister declared in the Lower House of the Parliament on 15 February 1956: "I am not aware of our government having ever said that they have adopted the doctrine of Ahimsa (non-violence) to our activities. They may respect it, they may honour the doctrine, but as a government it is patent that we do not consider ourselves capable of adopting the doctrine of Ahimsa."⁵⁸ Thus, it is no surprise that while India took the high ground and urged other states to resolve disputes through negotiation, she herself resorted to the use of force and, for example, took military action against the princely states of Junagadh (1948), Hyderabad (1949) and the Portuguese colony of Goa (1961). The declaratory nature of the policy of nonviolence is further clarified by the fact that even though India faced crippling poverty and illiteracy, problems which were identified by Nehru as having a higher priority than defence, by 1962 India nonetheless possessed the largest navy and air force of any country in the Indian Ocean region and had one of the largest standing armies in the world.⁵⁹

The Kautilyan brand of realism seems to pervade the Indian policy of nonalignment, which has been a cornerstone of Indian foreign and security policy since India's independence. The traditional view of nonalignment is that by adhering to this doctrine India would avoid being ensnared in the bipolar politics of the Cold War, safeguarding her sovereignty through neutrality, avoiding wars, and striving to achieve peace. However, to hold such view of nonalignment would be to miss the forest for the trees. Nonalignment was a policy pursued by India at that period of time so as to ensure her security. Given India's inferiority, notably vis-à-vis China, nonalignment was to be a transitional phase in its foreign policy; nonalignment would be pursued until India developed economic and military strength sufficient to protect her security. Nonalignment was a strategy to stay away from the bloc conflicts, not global politics in its entirety. It was a strategy to use diplomatic or, when the situation permitted, military means to gain influence despite material weakness. Simply put, nonalignment was a low-risk strategy to gain influence on the cheap.⁶⁰

Nonalignment did not prevent Nehru from seeking military aid from United States and Great Britain during the short Sino-Indian border war of 1962, nor did it restrain India from concluding the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. The latter assured, among other things, that both the parties will come to each other's aid in the event of an attack by a third party. The treaty also ensured the transfer of a huge quantity of Soviet weapons, which helped India to pursue its military intervention in East Pakistan (subsequently Bangladesh) in December 1971. In fact, as India's military might increased over time Indian analysts started to have a different notion of nonalignment. Thus, in 1978 Onkar Marwah would argue that:

In a separate development, Indian security managers now tend to view non-alignment with military power as maintaining the benefits that existed earlier for their state without a basis in power. In this context, the substance of

Indian nonalignment has become somewhat indistinguishable from the policies of other large states. That is, for a relatively weaker India, nonalignment in the short term was a balancing act that sought reductions in the “laws of political framework” and increases in the “laws of reciprocity” across the conflicts of the international system. Today, in discounting the present for future gains and with the experience of numerous wars, India’s nonalignment appears to have become a search for equal status with other large states, and hence a search for equal power.⁶¹

Questions can be posed as to whether Indian security policies are still influenced by Kautilyan thinking. While it is true that India did exhibit certain traits reminiscent of Kautilyan thinking during the Cold War era, one can ask how relevant those influences are today. The world has seen many changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. India has opened her economy and it appears that this has paid off handsomely; India’s rising economic and military power is becoming obvious. Her somewhat ambiguous relationship with the sole superpower, the United States, has improved remarkably and today the two countries are closer than ever before. On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared their resolve to transform the relationship between the two countries into a global partnership that will provide leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest. For the United States, India is an emerging great power and a key strategic partner.⁶² Under such changed circumstances, does it make sense to explore *The Arthashastra* for understanding of Indian strategic culture? For the reasons described herein, this article argues it does.

Conclusion

Even though the international environment has changed somewhat remarkably in certain areas, it still is helpful to remember Kautilya when trying to understand India. In an interesting recent article, Amrita Narlikar points out that even though India’s economic strength and image has radically changed in the last sixteen years, its negotiating style in various international forums and position on various international issues seems to bear a remarkable resemblance to the policies and positions of the “old” India. Making a comparative study of Indian negotiating strategies on both nuclear weapons and international trade issues, she argues that these policies, though sometimes appearing anachronistic, are very much a product of India’s perception of itself and its place in the world.⁶³ This is a reflection of India’s view of itself in a *matsya-nyaya* system and any permanent compromise at the negotiating table is viewed with caution, lest this lead to irreparable loss. The Kautilyan admonishment to be wary of depending on one group of “allies” also can be used to explain the fact that India has not dropped its allies in the developing world. Even while rubbing shoulders with the rich and powerful economies of the North, India also has been active in organizing groups of developing economies on trade issues and at times has been willing to deadlock negotiations rather than concede. Narlikar comes to the conclusion that it would be premature to see India’s improving relations with the North as a radical restructuring of its foreign policy. At the same time, India’s attempt to forge alliances with the South should not necessarily be seen as part of a concerted effort to build a counterhegemonic order.⁶⁴ Any serious student of Kautilya should not be at all surprised by this Indian behavior.

The Indian strategic community also seems to understand the concept of partnership (particularly with the United States) in a somewhat different vein than one might expect. With regard to the Indian Ocean, the Indian strategic community readily proclaims that

Indian security interests span “the region from the Gulf to Southeast Asia” and that U.S. “blessings” are not needed to confer “legitimacy” upon the Indian Navy’s presence there.⁶⁵ The differences are not limited to geographical parameters. It seems while both India and the U.S. agree that they have shared interests against common threats—terrorism, piracy, concern for the safety of sea lines of communications, and counterdrug, environmental pollution, counterproliferation and search and rescue operations—Indians have an expansive view of their responsibilities in the Indian Ocean region that is much grander than the Americans want to accept.⁶⁶ It would be beneficial for anyone interested in India and her strategic culture to think deeply about the Indian views of alliances.

The Arthashastra is important to understanding Indian strategic culture. It is not the sole work shaping India’s strategic behavior, but is an important one and, accordingly, should be studied. Of course, critics may question whether there is anything new in what Kautilya says. After all, the idea of the *matsya-nyaya*, the *mandala* system, is not uniquely Indian. A cursory glance at Europe’s history shows the widespread acceptance of similar ideas. Thus, the French and the Austrian Empire continuously strove to attain supremacy in Europe from the sixteenth century onwards. The struggle had all the hallmarks of the ideas presented in *The Arthashastra*, right down to the policy by that “most Christian king,” Louis XIV of France, to ally himself with the Ottoman Turks. The Turks attacked the Austrians from the rear while Louis attacked them from the front. Even religious figures were not above such methods. The need to blunt the imperial ambitions of France saw Pope Alexander VI joining hands with the Turkish sultan Bayazid II. Together they strove to contain the rise of Charles VIII’s France.

So what is so distinct about Indians operating along the same principles? To sceptics of Kautilya’s influence on Indian strategic culture, there is nothing specifically Indian about its efforts to control the actions of her neighbors and/or restrict extraregional influences on them, or interfering in their domestic affairs. She is merely acting like a big power, mimicking the way other big powers behave.⁶⁷ In other words, the logic of realism pervades its behavior, just as it does for all great and aspiring powers. However, this article is premised on the belief that there are, and can be, no “unencultured” realists.⁶⁸ Security communities might tend to act in similar ways at times, but that does not mean they have a universal theory of strategic behavior. The field of strategic studies operated under this false assumption when it accepted theories which were premised on the assumption of homogenous rational actors influenced by rational choices. But, as Colin Gray points out, one may be North Vietnamese, Chinese, Russian, Bosnian Serbian, Indian, North Korean, Iraqi, Iranian, or whatnot, but one performs realist calculations in ways that fit one’s values, not the logic of some general theory of deterrence.⁶⁹ Paul Kapur supports this when he discusses India-Pakistan nuclear policies and shows the differences between the applicability of the “stability-instability paradox” as understood in the Western world and in the subcontinent.⁷⁰

The same logic applies to strategic culture. Some patterns might be similar across various strategic cultures, but each strategic culture has its own values, ideas, and patterns of thinking which influence its strategic behavior and make it distinct. Strategic culture is the context that surrounds and gives meaning to strategic behavior and this behavior is affected by culturally shaped or “encultured” people, organizations, procedures and weapons.⁷¹ Thus, a thorough understanding of Kautilya’s ideas is useful in deciphering Indian strategic culture. This does not imply that *The Arthashastra* is the most important factor in the making of Indian strategic culture, a “silver bullet” that will lay that culture bare for us to see; it helps us understand the phenomenon of Indian strategic culture, but does not explain it fully. After all, with strategic-cultural issues one is discerning tendencies not rigid determinants.⁷² However, *The Arthashastra* offers to persistent and

careful readers valuable road signs that will help them in understanding Indian strategic behaviour.

Notes

1. Speech by Jawaharlal Nehru on the eve of India's independence day, 15 August 1947.
2. Anupam Srivasta, "Globalization and Economic Liberalization," in Devin T. Hagerty, ed., *South Asia in World Politics* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005), p. 262.
3. Amrita Narlikar, "Peculiar chauvinism or strategic calculation? Explaining the negotiating strategy of a rising India," *International Affairs*, volume 82:11 (January 2006), p. 59.
4. Eric Margolis, "India Rules the Waves," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, volume 131/3/1, 225 (March 2005), p. 66.
5. Ibid.
6. "India to buy 6 Scorpene submarines," <http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/12def.htm>, (accessed on February 10, 2006).
7. Rahul Bedi, "A New Doctrine for the Navy," *Frontline*, July 16, 2004, p. 46.
8. Ravi Sharma, "Engagement on the High Seas," *Frontline*, November 7, 2003, p. 42.
9. On the literature dealing with strategic culture see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security*, volume 19:4 (Spring 1995): 32–64; Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security*, volume 23:1 (Summer 1998): 141–170; Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security*, volume 6:2 (Fall 1981): 21–47; Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), especially chapter 5; and Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (London: Hamilton Press, 1986).
10. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, p. 28.
11. I have borrowed this description of strategic culture from Colin S. Gray, "National Style in Strategy: The American Example," *International Security*, volume 6:2 (Fall 1981): 22.
12. L. N. Rangarajan, ed., *Kautilya: The Arthashastra* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1992).
13. Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 57–58.
14. Ibid., p. 58.
15. Ibid., pp. 58–59.
16. Ibid., p. 56
17. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1967), p. 51.
18. Ibid.
19. Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967), pp. 94–95.
20. Usha Mehta and Usha Thakkar, *Kautilya and His Arthashastra* (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company Ltd., 1980), p. 1.
21. M.V. Krishna Rao, *Studies in Kautilya* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1979), p. 10.
22. Usha Mehta and Usha Thakkar, p. 5.
23. L. N. Rangarajan, p. 19.
24. Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, p. 59.
25. M. V. Krishna Rao, p. 13.
26. L. N. Rangarajan, p. 16.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 20.
29. Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, p. 60.
30. George Modelski, "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," *The American Political Science Review*, volume 58:3 (September 1964), p. 549.
31. Ibid.

32. L. N. Rangarajan, p. 15.
33. See Heinrich Zimmer, pp. 128–129 for a brilliant explanation of the *chakravartin* concept.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 119–120.
35. Usha Mehta and Usha Thakkar, p. 58.
36. The description of the *mandala* and the *shadgunya* policy are taken from Usha Mehta and Usha Thakkar, pp. 57–59.
37. L. N. Rangarajan, p. 549.
38. Usha Mehta and Usha Thakkar, p. 71.
39. George Modelski, p. 553
40. *Ibid.*
41. Heinrich Zimmer, pp. 118–123.
42. M. V. Krishna Rao, p. 101.
43. Imtiaz Ahmed, *State and Foreign Policy: India's Role in South Asia* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1993), pp. 220–221.
44. A. L. Basham, pp. 55–56.
45. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Continent of Circe* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), pp. 97–98.
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47. Darryl Howlett, "Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature," *Strategic Insights*, volume 4:10 (October 2005).
48. Nikolaos Ladis, *Assessing Greek Strategic Thought and Practice: Insights from Strategic Culture* (Ph.D dissertation, University of Southampton, United Kingdom, 2003), quoted in Darryl Howlett.
49. Myron Weiner, "Ancient Indian Political Theory and Contemporary Indian Politics," in S. N. Eisenstadt, Reuven Kahane, and David Shulman, eds., *Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Dissent in India* (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1984), p. 113.
50. Sidhu, p. 175.
51. Joel Larus, *Culture and Political-Military Behavior: The Hindus in Pre-Modern India* (Calcutta: Minerva Press, 1979) p. 163.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 101–102.
53. Imtiaz Ahmed, p. 217.
54. Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).
55. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
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58. Lorne J. Kavic, p. 3.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
60. Ashok Kapur, p. 57.
61. Onkar Marwah, "National Security and Military Policy in India," in Lawrence Ziring, ed., *The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, its Neighbors and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 32.
62. 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), p. 28.
63. Amrita Narlikar, p. 72.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
65. Juli A. MacDonald, quoted in Stephan Blank, *Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p. 76.
66. *Ibid.*

67. Varun Sahni, "Just Another big Country," in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds.), p. 161.
68. Colin S. Gray, "In praise of strategy," *Review of International Studies*, volume 29 (April 2003), p. 292.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
70. Paul S. Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not like Cold War Europe," *International Security*, volume 30:2 (Fall 2005), pp. 127–152.
71. Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies*, volume 25:1 (January 1999), p. 52.
72. Colin S. Gray (1986), p. 35.

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