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Moderate Machiavelli? Contrasting *The Prince* with the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya

ABSTRACT

Max Weber was the first to see that the writings of Machiavelli, when contrasted with the brutal realism of other cultural and political traditions, were not so extreme as they appear to some critics. "Truly radical 'Machiavelianism,' in the popular sense of that word," Weber said in his famous lecture "Politics as a Vocation," "is classically expressed in Indian literature in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya (written long before the birth of Christ, ostensibly in the time of Chandragupta [Maurya]): compared to it, Machiavelli's *The Prince* is harmless." In this article, I contrast Machiavelli's writings to those of Kautilya (c. 300 B.C.E.) and question why Machiavelli omitted the harsher aspects of political domination such as spies, assassination of enemies, and torture. Could it be that he was afraid to tell a prince about the harsher characteristics of tyrannical rule? If so, why?

KEYWORDS: Machiavelli, Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, ancient India

Introduction

Machiavelli shocked his contemporaries with his frank political realism when *The Prince* was published, and some modern writers have described Machiavelli as evil or, as Leo Strauss put it, “a teacher of evil.”¹ But what has startled me recently in re-reading *The Prince* is just how moderate the book appears when one contrasts it with books of genuine, unsparing political realism such as those found in the ancient Indian and Chinese traditions. To demonstrate this, I will contrast Machiavelli with the great Indian thinker Kautilya and his book the *Arthashastra*.

Max Weber recognised that *The Prince* is really a moderate book, that it could have been a far more brutally honest book about taking and holding political power. “Truly radical ‘Machiavellianism,’ in the popular sense of that word,” Weber said in his famous lecture “Politics as a Vocation,” “is classically expressed in Indian literature in the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya (written long before the birth of Christ, ostensibly in the time of Chandragupta [Maurya]): compared to it, Machiavelli’s *The Prince* is harmless.”² By reading Kautilya, who was the chief adviser to Chandragupta Maurya (c. 321-298 B.C.E.), the king who first unified the Indian subcontinent in empire, Weber saw clearly what Machiavelli toned down or left out. I will try to show in some detail what recommendations Machiavelli either made more moderate or even omitted altogether, and then I will attempt to answer why.

Machiavelli’s Moral Basis

While avoiding all absolute and unchanging moral principles, Machiavelli judged actions as good or bad based on the consequences. “As to the actions of all men and especially of princes, . . . everybody looks at their result.”³ The result that Machiavelli most sought was not an absolute and timeless good, but the common good or public good, variously expressed throughout *The Discourses* especially - but also other writings - as *bene commune*, *publica utilità*, *commune utilità*, or *salute della patria*.⁴

If one judges political actions by consequences, then, Machiavelli suggested, one must be willing sometimes to use political means that are violent, cruel, or commonly thought of as immoral. Quentin Skinner has noted that Machiavelli agreed with his contemporaries that the proper political goals are “honour, glory, and fame.” But Machiavelli scoffed at the widespread

belief that one could always attain such ends by being humane and pious.⁵ Hence, Machiavelli offered his famous advice that a prince “must acquire the power to be not good, and understand when to use it and when not to use it, in accord with necessity.”⁶ In other words, a political and/or a military leader must recognise that to accomplish something good or great or glorious - something ‘grand and magnificent’- such as founding a new state or establishing the rule of law or saving an army, one must be willing to dirty one’s hands with means commonly thought to be immoral, actions that one would probably never even consider in one’s private life.⁷ Machiavelli made his case plainly. “And it is essential to realise this: that a prince, and above all a prince that is new, cannot practice all those things for which men are considered good, being often forced, in order to keep his position, to act contrary to truth, contrary to charity, contrary to humanity, contrary to religion.”⁸

This moral position is unsettling and disturbing to us, although that does not mean that it is wrong. If one wants to accomplish some good, Machiavelli argued, then sometimes - by no means always - one must be willing to undertake what would be widely regarded as an evil or immoral action. Consider one example from *The Art of War*. “Sertorius, fighting a battle in Spain, killed one who reported the death of one of his officers, for fear if he said the same thing to others, he would dismay them.”⁹ In other words, to save his army from possible panic and defeat, Sertorius committed the ‘immoral’ action of summary execution.

In *The History of Florence*, one can see that the two evils Machiavelli feared most were tyrants, defined as a prince ruling with the help of rapacious nobles, and the violent lawlessness that characterised much of Florence’s history.¹⁰ Consider the first evil. To defeat tyranny, one must sometimes act in a violent and destructive manner, and Machiavelli criticised his friend Pietro Soderini, who headed the Florentine Republic from 1502-1512, because he was such a ‘good’ man - kind, humane, pious - that he brought ruin to himself and the Florentine people. Put bluntly, Soderini could only have saved his republic and brought about the general good of Florence by killing and/or exiling the leaders of the Florentine nobility, especially the Medici.

Pietro Soderini . . . acted in all his affairs with kindness and patience. Prosperity came to him and his native city while the times were in harmony with his way of acting, but when afterward times came in which he needed to break

off his patience and humility, he could not do it. Hence, along with his city, he fell.¹¹

Or, as Machiavelli noted in *The Discourses*, to save the Roman Republic, Brutus was willing to “condemn his sons to death” - because his sons wished to establish a tyranny - and anyone “who sets a state free, but does not kill Brutus’ sons, maintains himself but a little while.”¹²

In *The History of Florence*, Machiavelli recounts a relentless parade of violent chaos, a terrifying lawlessness that prevailed in Florence and in Italy decade after decade - violent changes of regimes, wars among city states, fights between factions, arbitrary arrests, assassinations, torture, and so on. Although Machiavelli’s fondest wish was for establishing a republic modelled after ancient Rome, at the very least he wanted an effective prince who would rule by clear and effective laws. To accomplish this much, Machiavelli argued one would probably need violence and what the world would call cruelty. In *The Prince* he distinguished between cruelties that are ‘well used’ and those that are ‘badly used.’

Well used we call those (if of what is bad we can use the word *well*) that a conqueror carries out at a single stroke, as a result of a need to secure himself, but then does not persist in, but transmutes into the greatest possible benefits to his subjects. *Badly used* are those which, though few in the beginning, rather increase with time than disappear.¹³

A leader must undertake the necessary cruelties all at once, but “benefits are to be conferred little by little, so they will be savoured more.”¹⁴

In Machiavelli’s topsy-turvy world in which what the many ordinarily call ‘good’ can bring disaster to a city whereas what is commonly regarded as ‘bad’ can result in the common good, Machiavelli literally stated that cruelty, if well committed, can in fact be merciful.

A wise prince, then, is not troubled about a reproach for cruelty for which he keeps his subjects united and loyal because, giving a very few examples of cruelty, he is much more merciful than those who, through too much mercy let evils continue, from which result murders or plunder.¹⁵

This is one of the key reasons that Machiavelli has been called evil and immoral, that is, because he judged actions - the means - by the results or

the end, because he claimed that sometimes what is called evil can bring about consequences that are good, and because he said that violence and cruelty if used properly can *sometimes* have the consequence of dramatically reducing violence and cruelty. Machiavelli saw himself as realistic, someone dealing with real experience in the political world and not dreaming up ideal states with one's imagination, ideal states that might offer the picture of kindness and goodness, but which had no use in reshaping or reforming the brutal realities of Renaissance Italy.¹⁶

The Moral Foundation Under Kautilya's 'Science of Politics'

As the key adviser to the emperor Chandragupta Maurya, Kautilya was willing to use harsh means to seize power from the Nanda kings and unify India, much as Machiavelli justified violence to bring a lawful order to - or unify - Italy. As Kautilya put it at the very end of his *Arthashastra*, "This science has been composed by him [Kautilya], who in resentment, quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and [conquered] the earth that was under control of the Nanda kings."¹⁷ Kautilya claimed only that he 'regenerated' the *Arthashastra*, a word roughly translated as 'the science of politics,' and in fact historians can count at least eighteen precursors working on an *arthashastra*; Kautilya himself mentioned fourteen earlier thinkers. Because much of the description in Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is corroborated by the writings of the Greek ambassador Megasthenes and by the pillar and rock inscriptions or edicts of Ashoka, most scholars conclude that this book gives us a somewhat accurate depiction of Chandragupta Maurya's empire and subsequently even that of Ashoka (268-233 BC) - Chandragupta's grandson - the greatest emperor of the Mauryas and widely regarded as one of the great, just, and compassionate kings in all of human history.¹⁸

The capital of the empire under Chandragupta Maurya was Pataliputra (modern Patna), probably the largest city in the world at that time, a city eight miles long and a mile and a half wide whose walls had five hundred and seventy towers. All of this was surrounded by a moat nine hundred feet wide. India's population at the time was approximately fifty million, and the king's army totalled about six hundred thousand men, thirty thousand cavalry, eight thousand chariots, and nine thousand elephants. The extent of this empire was, and is, astonishing. Chandragupta Maurya's empire was larger than the

British empire in India, larger than modern India, extending in fact all the way into Persia.¹⁹

Indian authors embrace Kautilya's *Arthashastra* as a treatise on the reality of politics every bit as important as Plato and Aristotle's ideals of politics. As D. D. Kosambi has put it, Athenian democracy failed rather quickly, while Kautilya's ideas better fit the time and place, and made for a realistic politics. "The Greeks make excellent reading; the Indian treatise worked infinitely better in practice for its own time and place."²⁰ It is his unrelenting, unsparing realism of Kautilya that makes so many authors liken him to Machiavelli.

The word *arthashastra* literally means 'science of wealth,' although it is often translated as 'the science of politics.' But Kautilya's *Arthashastra* is clearly more like a science of political economy, because he emphasised the importance of a prosperous economy - a very centralised and government controlled economy - for a successful kingdom. "The source of the livelihood of men is wealth, in other words, the earth inhabited by men. The science which is the means of the attainment and protection of that earth is the Science of Politics."²¹ By our modern standards, we would not call his treatise a science, but it certainly is a hard-nosed, empirical look at the way the political world works, based on experience and observation of history and of his own time. Whereas Kautilya admitted that he was hardly the first to write an *arthashastra*, he did claim to have brought together "as many treatises on the Science of Politics as have been composed by ancient teachers for the acquisition and protection of the earth."²² However, he was clearly proud, even boastful, of the value of his science which he "composed for the acquisition and protection of this world and the next."²³ Science - not religion and not superstition - will bring success, and indeed, "The object slips away from the foolish person, who continuously consults the stars . . . what will the stars do?"²⁴ By contrast, Kautilya's science, somewhat like Hobbes', was supposed to be infallible, because it creates and "preserves spiritual good, material well-being and pleasures, and destroys spiritual evil, material loss and hatred."²⁵

Kautilya's 'science' was for a king. Kautilya assumed that the empire that he helped to establish was good and could only be ruled by a powerful king. "For, the king, trained in the sciences, intent on the discipline of the subjects, enjoys the earth (alone) without sharing it with any (other) ruler, being devoted to the welfare of all beings."²⁶ Answering to the king was a vast bureaucracy

of government officials who were to administer something like an absolutist welfare state, what historian Stanley Wolpert has called a “socialised monarchy.”²⁷

Even though Kautilya sought to defend - and expand - an empire or kingdom, whereas Machiavelli wanted to establish lawful government and probably hoped for an expansionistic republic like that of ancient Rome, Kautilya had similar moral principles that judged political actions by their results. As a result, like Machiavelli, Kautilya too has been accused of being immoral. Kosambi has written that in Kautilya’s *Arthashastra*, “there is not the least pretence at morality,” whilst Erich Frauwallner says that Kautilya has “no moral scruples,” and T. W. Rhys Davies labels Kautilya as “depraved at heart.”²⁸ However, like Machiavelli, Kautilya judged actions by their results. The king must do what is “beneficial” for the whole kingdom and “bring about security and well-being.”²⁹ Kautilya’s goals for India’s empire were crystal clear. “Material gain, spiritual good, and pleasures: this is the triad of gain.”³⁰ Paternalistic in almost a literal sense, the king “should favour the stricken (subjects) like a father.”³¹ Whereas the king himself, by means of his very centralised administration, should “maintain children, aged persons, and persons in distress when these are helpless,” judges in the kingdom should concern themselves with the affairs of “women, minors, old persons, sick persons, who are helpless [even] when these do not approach the court.”³² In his *Arthashastra*, his ‘science of politics,’ Kautilya detailed a long list of ‘secret practices’ to destroy enemies whom he calls the ‘unrighteous’. However, Kautilya condoned all this violence because it would allow “for the consolidation of the kingdom” and enable the king to “destroy the enemies and protect his own people.”³³ In short, Kautilya judged a ruler’s actions not by the means but by the consequences or results. “In the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king and in what is beneficial to the subjects his own benefit.”³⁴

Kautilya answers those who consider him immoral by showing again and again that the right action is often, perhaps even usually, the one in the king’s self-interest, that is, the right action in politics often brings about the general good. Kautilya recognised that social justice in the kingdom promotes the king’s power and interest; if the people are poor or oppressed, they will become discontented and either support the enemy or slay the king.³⁵ Kautilya

himself argued in a long passage that social justice is usually in the king's political interest. If a king favours the wicked and banishes the good, acts in an impious manner, punishes the good and rewards the evil, steals from and oppresses ordinary people, harms "principal men and [dishonours] those worthy of honour," then he will create only greed and disaffection among the people. "Subjects, when impoverished, become greedy; when greedy they become disaffected; when disaffected they either go over to the enemy or themselves kill the master."³⁶ Promoting social justice and prosperity for his people is usually in the king's self-interest.

Machiavelli and Kautilya: Differing Political Assumptions and Goals

Machiavelli and Kautilya shared the ethical conviction that a leader may, and sometimes must, use morally dubious means to obtain a good end, some version of the general good. And each put a high priority on unifying a state, with Machiavelli wanting to restore the greatness and glory of ancient Rome and with Kautilya seeking to establish and maintain a unified kingdom on the Indian subcontinent. Both also defended an expansive empire.³⁷ Here the similarities end, because the cultural heritage that shaped each thinker was entirely different. While dreaming of establishing republican virtue modelled after Rome, Machiavelli sought greatness, virtue, and "true glory."³⁸ "Not individual good but common good is what makes cities great. Yet without doubt this common good is thought important only in republics."³⁹ If a republic was not possible - and Machiavelli at times seemed to think a republic was not a practical alternative - then Machiavelli at least wanted the rule of law, because "the people wish to live according to the laws."⁴⁰

Whereas the centuries-old shadow of the Roman Republic coloured everything that Machiavelli wrote, Kautilya lived in a time in which no one could dream of escaping India's caste system that outlined a rigid division of labour based on caste or class (*varna*) and subcaste (*jāti*). The Portuguese translated the Sanskrit word *varna* as 'caste,' although 'class' would be a more appropriate rendering. The roots of the caste system extend back to about 1200 BC, and the four *varnas* were mentioned in the *Rig Veda* composed at about that time.⁴¹ Kautilya outlined in a traditional fashion the 'special duties' of the four classes. The brahmin was a priest whose main tasks were "studying,

teaching, performing sacrifices." The kshatriya, or warrior, had the specific duty of "living by (the profession of) of arms and protecting beings." The vaishya was generally a cultivator or trader or, as Kautilya put it, one who engaged in "agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade." And finally, the shudras were generally either agricultural workers, day-labourers, or artisans such as tanners, tailors, and millers.⁴² Eventually, another group or class emerged whose tasks were deemed so unclean that no one would allegedly want to touch them, although these 'untouchables' or 'outcastes' were not really a fifth class, because they were considered outside the social order altogether.

One important note on the caste system of India. While the caste or class of the individual was extremely important, for example, in matters of marriage (one must marry within one's own class and usually to someone in a comparable subcaste) and in patterns of eating (one must receive food from and eat only with those of the same or a higher class), in fact the occupational group, subcaste, or *jāti* into which one was born - indeed, *jāti* is the word used in India for 'caste' - was, and is, probably more important.⁴³ A child born into the subcaste of a miller (probably a shudra) or a washer of clothes (an untouchable, because soiled cloths are by their nature 'unclean') was almost always fixed into that *jāti* for life. Thus, Indian society was characterised by class hierarchy and a vast, detailed, and largely inherited division of labour. According to the Hinduism reflected in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, the kingdom will prosper if each does the special duty outlined by one's *varna* and one's *jāti*. As it says in the *Bhagavad Gita*, "And do thy duty, even if it be humble, rather than another's, even if it be great. To die in one's duty is life: to live in another's is death."⁴⁴ Therefore, according to Kautilya, a king who ensures that all adhere to their specific duties, will find "joy after death and in this life."⁴⁵ In defending this Hindu system of class and caste, the king brings about "the right conduct of the world."⁴⁶ Like Plato, Kautilya saw only disaster if society allowed the "mixture (of duties and castes)."⁴⁷

Kautilya's king had no choice but to ground his authority on the traditional system of class and caste. How could it be otherwise? Both class and caste had been taking root in India for many centuries. Kautilya realised that in most cases the king had to rely upon, and make use of, customs and the status quo, and here he used the traditional social structure upheld by the Vedic religion and brahmins. Religion was to support state power.⁴⁸ But the interests

of a king ruling over an empire were emphatically not always identical with the demands of the status quo of class and caste. After all, the Indian caste system is so decentralised in the villages that it hardly needs a central government to thrive, as has been seen more than once in Indian history. Kautilya saw that the needs of royal power must sometimes go against tradition and religion. At first, Kautilya stated that the king upholds the law and thereby can “conquer the earth up to its four ends.”⁴⁹ Kautilya sought a king who would be a world conqueror, a *cakravārtin*. But what happens if a custom goes against the principles of Kautilya’s *Arthashastra*? Here, the king must decide by edict! The king “shall decide . . . a matter in which a settled custom . . . contradicts the science of law.”⁵⁰ Such a radical notion in ancient India! The king’s decree could outweigh religion and tradition. Kautilya regarded the needs of empire as paramount, superior to the claims of religion, class, and custom.⁵¹ So too did Machiavelli, for example, when he wrote in 1527, “I love my native city more than my soul.”⁵²

Kautilya, in the boldest of his promises, asserted that one who knows his science of politics can conquer the world. “But one possessed of personal qualities, though ruling over a small territory . . . conversant with (the science of) politics, does conquer the entire earth, never loses.”⁵³ There is no humility here. Kautilya’s science brings an abundance of wealth and outlines correct strategies in politics and war, and with this science anyone can succeed. “And winning over and purchasing men of energy, those possessed of might, even women, children, lame and blind persons, have conquered the world.”⁵⁴ Nor did Kautilya see this conquest as something unjust. A king who carries out his duty, rules according to law, metes out only just punishment, applies the law equally “to his son and his enemy,” and protects his subjects not only goes “to heaven” but “would conquer the earth up to its four ends.”⁵⁵ Whereas Kautilya did not talk of glory, I do believe he was thinking of something we might call ‘greatness,’ but this came only with social justice and the morally correct ordering of the world. “And after conquering the world, he should enjoy it divided into *varnas* and *āśramas* [four stages of life] in accordance with his own duty.”⁵⁶

Kautilya apparently meant by the phrase “conquering the world” something like conquering up to what Indians regarded as the natural borders of India, from the Himalayas all the way south and from the Arabian Sea to the Bay

of Bengal, although Kautilya said, “the region of the sovereign ruler extends northwards between the Himavat and the sea, one thousand *yojanas* [about nine thousand miles!] in extent across.”⁵⁷ As Kangle puts it, in the Indian tradition, the world conqueror or *cakravartin* was not one who conquered “regions beyond the borders of India.”⁵⁸ *Cakra* means wheel, and it is possible that the Indian concept of the world conqueror involves someone who rules as far as his chariots can roll without obstacles or opposition.⁵⁹ As Narasingha Prosad Sil notes, “For Kautilya a world conquest is the true foundation for world peace.”⁶⁰ Thus, in Kautilya’s worldview out of conquest comes peace, social justice, and the right ordering of the world according to castes and subcastes, as well as Hindu religious principles. A far cry from Machiavelli’s longing for the ancient Roman republic!

Kautilya More Willing to Use Extreme Measures

As vital as this difference between a republic and the hierarchy of caste is - and certainly one can see that Machiavelli and Kautilya have dramatically different conceptions of the general good - there is another startling difference. Whereas Kautilya’s *Arthashastra* dives to the details of violence, Machiavelli’s *The Prince* skirts around these specifics; whereas Kautilya unabashedly outlines the kinds of violence a king who wants to maintain and extend his power must use, Machiavelli offers a few examples but leaves much unspoken. Consider three examples: spies, torture, and assassination.

Spies

Kautilya urged the king to spy upon literally everyone in the kingdom. He first discussed ascertaining the integrity of ministers ‘by means of secret tests.’ For example, in ‘the test of fear,’ after throwing all ministers in jail, the king would use a secret agent to try to incite these ministers to agree to kill the king out of fear. Or, in ‘the test of piety,’ the king’s men would try to instigate rebellion on the grounds that the king was impious. In ‘the test of material gain,’ the king’s agents would try to provoke ministers to treason with the promise of great wealth. Finally, in ‘the test of lust,’ agents provocateurs would try to stir a minister to rebellion by telling him that the queen loved him.⁶¹ (This was, apparently, the best test to pass; “for having relations with the king’s wife, the (punishment) in all cases (shall be) cooking in a big jar”!)⁶² Those who failed a test would generally work in mines, factories, and forests.

Spying went well beyond tempting ministers. "When [the king] has set spies on the high officials," wrote Kautilya, "he should set spies on the citizens and the country people."⁶³ The list of possible spies is overwhelming; here are just some of those Kautilya suggested.

The Administrator should station in the country (secret agents) appearing as holy ascetics, wandering monks, . . . wandering minstrels, jugglers, tramps, fortune-tellers, soothsayers, astrologers, physicians, lunatics, dumb persons, deaf persons, vintners, dealers in bread, dealers in cooked meat, and dealers in cooked rice.⁶⁴

Nor was Kautilya above using women and children as spies and even as assassins.⁶⁵ Spies disguised as ascetics should discover who is discontented in the countryside. In a touch of humour for a rather humourless book, a subject who is disgruntled should be placed in "the office of collecting fines and taxes"!⁶⁶ Beyond this, such a person might be killed or sent to the mines or factories. After a criminal has been discovered and arrested on information provided by spies, officials should boast of the extent of the 'king's power' with a goal of convincing the people of the 'king's omniscience.'⁶⁷ In other words, Kautilya perceived every crime as a direct challenge to royal authority, and he hoped to induce everyone to watch everyone else - Foucault's worst nightmare. To be sure, one purpose of spying was to ascertain public opinion, to know as quickly as possible grievances of the people that the king could redress. Kautilya, though, urged spying that extended well beyond taking the pulse of the people.

None of this was haphazard. In the countryside, an Administrator should set one revenue officer to watch over a group of five to ten villages; in the city, the City-Superintendent should name section officers to look after "a group of ten families or twenty or forty families."⁶⁸ (The only state I can liken this to is Communist China under Mao.) Spies should "get information about strangers," "ascertain the honesty or dishonesty of farmers," "report one who spends lavishly and one who does a rash deed," and find out who has had a wound treated secretly or anyone who committed "an unwholesome act."⁶⁹ Spies should report all of these people and more to the appropriate officials.

By contrast, one can find no mention of spies in Machiavelli's *Prince*, even though there can be no doubt that he well knew the use of spies. He took

spying for granted in *The History of Florence*, he had read Tacitus who talks in detail of spies and informers in the Roman Empire, and in *The Art of War*, he wrote, "If in the daytime you wish to see whether any spy has come into the camp, have every man go to his quarters."⁷⁰ Even though spies were a routine part of his Florentine political world and the ancient political orders he studied, nevertheless, in *The Prince* Machiavelli neglected to give his prince the obvious advice about gathering intelligence through a network of spies and informers. Why? Of course we will never know. Perhaps he forgot to mention the necessity of protecting oneself and gathering information with spies. Perhaps Machiavelli thought it was too obvious to mention. One quick reading of Machiavelli's *History of Florence*, a roller coaster ride through civil wars, factions, riots, plots, torture, failed poisonings and successful assassinations, and it is difficult to imagine a Florentine leader surviving for long without the services of spies. And yet Machiavelli omits such advice about spies. Whatever the reason, the absence of any mention of spies in *The Prince* is strange, but it only becomes obvious when one contrasts *The Prince* with the *Arthashastra*.

Arrest on Suspicion and Torture

Even more chilling for one who believes in civil liberties, Kautilya left wide latitude for "arrest on suspicion," and detailed a lengthy list of suspicious acts including "one who spends lavishly," "one travelling frequently," "one devoted to a beloved," and "one moving at an odd time in a solitary place or a forest."⁷¹ Kautilya continued by mentioning in a matter-of-fact way that those arrested may be subject to torture. A suspect who cannot prove his innocence "shall be put to torture" for a maximum of three days, although Kautilya wanted to prohibit torture for "trifling" offences and for one "who is a minor or aged or sick or intoxicated or insane or overcome by hunger, thirst or travel."⁷² Brahmin priests, too, were exempt from torture, although a brahmin could be branded on the forehead. Nevertheless, officials should use torture for "one whose guilt is found to be probable," and Kautilya, with his usual meticulous detail, outlined "the ordinary fourfold torture" and the more elaborate "eighteen-fold torture."⁷³ Torture for one who was probably guilty was not limited to a total of three days, but mercifully, torture was to be only "on alternate days!"⁷⁴ At any rate, Kautilya assumed that torture would be necessary in order to protect the king and the state against real and possible enemies.

By contrast, we find no mention of when to arrest one's suspected enemies much less any discussion of torture in *The Prince*, even though Machiavelli himself was tortured by Lorenzo de Medici's regime - the grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent - and even though one can gather from *The History of Florence* that torture was somewhat common.⁷⁵ And yet Machiavelli did not advise his prince at all about the whole penal apparatus of arrest, prison, and torture. Once more, if Machiavelli is such a brutal realist, we are left wondering about why he omitted advising his prince about strategies of fear and intimidation that, sadly to be sure, have been used in tyrannies throughout history and across cultures.

Assassination

The empire in which Kautilya and Chandragupta Maurya lived was a world under constant threat of assassination to all who were powerful, especially the king, and Kautilya urged detailed precautions against assassination - tasters for food, elaborate ways to detect poison, barbers who used only the king's instruments, trusted slaves rubbing clothes against their eyes before handing them to the king, snake killers fanning out in a forest before the king went for a walk, and so on.⁷⁶ Moreover, Kautilya certainly did not shrink from using assassination against treasonable principal officers. Against such dangers the king should use the "weeding of thorns" - essentially secret assassination, and also called "silent punishment" - "finding pleasure in (doing his duty)."⁷⁷ Examples of pleasurable duties are: incite the son of a treasonable officer to kill his father, and then arrest the son for patricide; kill a suspected traitor on a highway and blame it on robbers; invite treasonable officers to see the king and kill them, executing an ordinary criminal for the offence; and use poison frequently.⁷⁸ Kautilya had no qualms about violation of what we call due process. The good of the kingdom was the king's only standard of judgment. The king "should employ 'silent punishment' towards his own party or that of the enemy, without hesitation."⁷⁹ Or more broadly, "For the sake of protecting the four *varnas*, he should use secret practices against the unrighteous."⁸⁰ (Like Machiavelli, Kautilya urged that the king kill an enemy, but "he shall not covet the land, property, sons or wives of the slain one."⁸¹ Or, as Machiavelli put it in describing the "wise prince": "Above all, he refrains from the property of others, because men forget more quickly the death of a father than the loss of a father's estate.")⁸²

All these details of assassination applied to the palace as well as to the populace. Whereas Kautilya wrote about how a prince who is out of favour might take the throne, he also advised a king on how to test a recalcitrant and possibly unfit prince. If the king has only one son, he should confine the prince and give him another chance, but “if [the king] has (other) sons, he should kill him.”⁸³ Even a disobedient prince cannot get in the way of a kingdom’s success, and kings must be alert against sons. As Kautilya said, paraphrasing an ancient Indian proverb, “For, princes devour their begetters, being of the same nature of crabs.”⁸⁴

In his discussions of warfare, Kautilya spoke of open or declared war and what we would call guerilla warfare, but added something called ‘silent war’ in which one waged a secret war of assassination, propaganda, and disinformation against an enemy that one openly called a friend. “Of war, there is open war, concealed war, and silent war.”⁸⁵ Machiavelli was so intent on achieving the *gloria* and honour of ancient republics that he had nothing of this kind in his *The Art of War*, and one would have to read Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* - in which he also suggests when to use assassination and disinformation with an enemy against whom one is supposedly at peace - to get advice similar to that of Kautilya.⁸⁶

Machiavelli did not advise his prince in any systematic way how and when to use methods of assassination, even though assassination was common in Florence and discussed repeatedly and methodically in *The History of Florence*.⁸⁷ Both Cosimo de Medici and Lorenzo de Medici survived attempted assassinations. Possibly the most dramatic tale Machiavelli related in *The History of Florence* was that of the 1478 Pazzi Conspiracy in which assassins killed Giuliano de Medici and wounded Lorenzo de Medici in the Cathedral of Santa Reparata.⁸⁸

Machiavelli did discuss assassination in *The Prince*. He apparently approved of assassination in the case of Cesare Borgia who took Romagna, used the cruel Remirro de Orco to bring order with harsh means, and then killed him by cutting him in two pieces and by placing him on display in the public square. He apparently approved of Remirro de Orco’s cruel measures, because they brought to Romagna “good government” and “rendered the province peaceful and united.”⁸⁹ In the next chapter, he condemned as wicked the assassinations of Agathocles and Liverotto of Fermo who slaughtered his

enemies at a banquet.⁹⁰ Machiavelli wrote occasionally, but approvingly, of assassination if it brought peace, good government, and good laws, but condemned it as wicked if it simply furthered the narrow ambition of some prince. What is important is that he never systematically discussed and advocated assassination as a proper means to defend a kingdom or republic, as did Kautilya, nor did he discuss the paramilitary forces or secret agents who would carry out such violence. If Machiavelli approved of assassination in dangerous and violent circumstances, then why did he not write about it in *The Prince* in a systematic way?

Conclusion

Why didn't Machiavelli advise a prince in an organised fashion on how and when to use spies, torture, and assassination? Why is Machiavelli so moderate on issues of extra-legal violence when compared to Kautilya? Why didn't he tell his prince to acquire a paramilitary force that could intimidate and strike fear in any opponent? Aristotle related that Pisistratus became tyrant of Athens with personal and devoted thugs called 'club-bearers,' and Aristotle also observed that a "tyrant should lop off those who are too high; he should put to death men of spirit."⁹¹ Later, Tacitus noted that Tiberius had a private army to help him secure power at the death of Augustus.⁹² Machiavelli had read Aristotle, Tacitus, and others who offered similar descriptions of a tyrant's actions. So why did Machiavelli omit almost all discussion of the routine use of violence outside the laws by a prince or a tyrant and the officials or officers who would have to oversee it? He did not omit these topics because he did not know of them; he did not avoid this material because it would take up too much space, because a discussion of all of these means of violence could fit into one short chapter; and I don't think he left out discussions of spies, torture, and assassination because he believed them to be counterproductive measures that always brought hatred and instability. Surely, Machiavelli would have acknowledged that sometimes - perhaps only infrequently - these measures would be necessary for a prince to maintain power, to protect himself and even occasionally to make certain the city was safe.

I think Machiavelli omitted these details and moderated his advice to a prince for two related reasons. First, Machiavelli had a great admiration for and love for the people, and ordinary people suffer most when private paramilitary forces become lawless, violent, and cruel. We know from his letters that when

he was out of office, Machiavelli spent his days, not with wealthy merchants and not with the nobility, but with working people - "a butcher, a miller, two furnace tenders."⁹³ Indeed, he confided to a friend that he always saw the affairs of the world from the perspective of the people or, as he put it, through "the [mirror] of the many."⁹⁴ While his contemporaries saw the people as irrational, violent, and cruel, Machiavelli instead claimed that "a people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince."⁹⁵ It is an unchecked nobility that will always seek to exploit and to outrage the people in every possible way.⁹⁶ Machiavelli softened his advice to a prince in part because he knew that in the chaos brought by extra-legal violence and hired thugs, the people would suffer the most.

In addition, his sympathies for a republic, indeed his intense and nostalgic yearning for the Roman republic, convinced him that there was no glory or honour or greatness in spies, torture, and assassination. As he said in *The Prince*: "It cannot, however, be called virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens, to betray friends, to be without fidelity, without mercy, without religion; such proceedings enable one to gain sovereignty, but not fame."⁹⁷ Machiavelli's political realism was moderated by his wishes for republican virtue, for "true glory," and for men longing to undertake deeds "grand and magnificent."⁹⁸ These republican dreams in the end made Machiavelli a less effective but more likeable realist than Kautilya who had no romantic prism refracting his political insights.

When one returns to Machiavelli's *The Art of War* after reading the military writings of Sun Tzu and Kautilya, it is readily apparent that Machiavelli is not even trying to tell us something new about warfare, because he believed the ancient Greeks and Romans - aside from such things as artillery - knew it all. In the last paragraph of *The Art of War*, he says that Italy "seems born to raise up dead things, as she has in poetry, in painting, and in sculpture."⁹⁹ And what 'dead things' does Machiavelli want to raise up? Rome's battalions and legions and cohorts. And maybe Scipio once again arraigned across the plain from Hannibal. And thus compared to Kautilya and Sun Tzu, Machiavelli's writings on warfare are tired and tedious, filled with nostalgia for long dead legions that once gained glory. He wants the public battlefield, the grand spectacle, fame for some and cowardice for others. Sun Tzu and Kautilya didn't care a wit for glory and fame. They wanted to win at all costs

and to keep casualties - on both sides - to a minimum. Said Sun Tzu, "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."¹⁰⁰ They were also prepared to win in ways Machiavelli would regard as loathsome and disgraceful - assassination, disinformation, causing quarrels between ministers by bribes or by means of jealousy over a beautiful woman planted as a secret agent, and so on. In his own early prejudice against Asia, Machiavelli wrote that Asia had 'few able men' in military matters, because their empires brought a stifling peace, but Machiavelli who offers no systematic discussion of even guerilla warfare would have been easily outmatched by generals reading either Sun Tzu or Kautilya.¹⁰¹

It is precisely because he loved republics, trusted the people, and wanted the people to share in government - ideas foreign to Kautilya - that he wrote a much more moderate book to a prince than he could have by omitting discussions of spies, torture, and assassins. Princes, not the people, are the ones who cannot be trusted with such knowledge.

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Notes

- ¹ Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958, p. 9. Also, Quentin Skinner, *The Renaissance*, vol. 1 of *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 118-138, and J. G. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 194-199.
- ² Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," ed. W. G. Runciman, trans. Eric Matthews, *Weber: Selections in Translation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 220.
- ³ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* in ed. and trans., Allan Gilbert, *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, 3 vols. Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1965, p. 67. Also, Sheldon Wolin, "Machiavelli: Politics and the Economy of Violence," in *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1960, pp. 207-209, 220-228.

- ⁴ Russell Price, "Ambizione in Machiavelli's Thought," *History of Political Thought*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1982, pp. 383-445; Anthony Parel, "Introduction: Machiavelli's Method and His Interpreters," in Anthony Parel, *The Political Calculus: Essays On Machiavelli's Philosophy*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, pp. 3-32; and Anthony J. Parel, "Machiavelli's Notions of Justice: Text and Analysis," *Political Theory*, vol. 18, no. 4, 1990, pp. 528-44.
- ⁵ Skinner, *The Machiavellian Moment*, p. 131.
- ⁶ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 58.
- ⁷ Machiavelli, *The Art of War* in Gilbert, *The Chief Works*, p. 568. Also, Russell Price, "The Theme of *Gloria* in Machiavelli," *Renaissance Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 4, 1977, pp. 588-631.
- ⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 66.
- ⁹ Machiavelli, *Art of War*, p. 654.
- ¹⁰ Roger Boesche, *Theories of Tyranny: From Plato to Arendt*. University Park, Pa, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996, pp. 124-29. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli advised a prince to rule with the support of the people, but most often he noted that successful princes ruled hand in hand with the nobility. For example, "A prince alone, lacking a nobility, cannot support the weight of a principedom." Machiavelli, *A Discourse on Remodelling the Government of Florence*, in Gilbert, *The Chief Works*, p. 107.
- ¹¹ Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, in Gilbert, *The Chief Works*, p. 453. Also, Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, p. 207; Felix Gilbert, *Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1984, pp. 7-19; and John M. Najemy, "Machiavelli and the Medici: The Lessons of Florentine History," *Renaissance Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 4, 1982, pp. 551-76. The Medici in fact ruled along with only a few members of the patrician class. See Gene Brucker, *Renaissance Florence*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1969, pp. 85-89, 97, 102-5, 124, 257; also J. R. Hale, *Florence and the Medici: The Pattern of Control*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1977, pp. 35-75. For an idealised description of the rule of Lorenzo de Medici who, so it is claimed, brought "vitality and gaiety" to Florence, see Christopher Hibbert, *The Rise and Fall of the House of Medici*, London, Penguin, 1979, pp. 210, 165-74.
- ¹² Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, pp. 424-25. Also, Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957; Neil Wood, "Machiavelli's Humanism in Action," in ed, Parel, *The Political Calculus*, pp. 33-57; and Marcia L. Colish, "The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 32, no. 3, 1971, pp. 323-50.
- ¹³ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 38.

- ¹⁴ *Ibid.* Also, Sebastian de Grazia, *Machiavelli in Hell*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 83-87, 302-317.
- ¹⁵ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 61.
- ¹⁶ Martin Fleisher, "The Ways of Machiavelli and the Ways of Politics," *History of Political Thought*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1995, pp. 330-55, see p. 335.
- ¹⁷ R. P. Kangle, ed. and trans. *The Kautilya Arthashastra*, 3 vols., 2nd ed., New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1972, vol. 2, Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, Book 15, Chapter 1, line 73, page 516; hereafter *Arthashastra*, 15.1.73; p. 516. Despite the book's importance, one cannot buy Kautilya's *Arthashastra* through regular publishing channels in the United States. I know of only a single article and no books published in the United States or Australia on Kautilya and his *Arthashastra*. There are many sources published in English in India and a few in Great Britain. I have used R.P. Kangle, ed. and trans. *The Kautiliya Arthashastra*, 3 vols. The first volume contains Kautilya's *Arthashastra* in Sanskrit, the second volume has a very literal translation of the *Arthashastra* in English with copious notes about possible alternative renderings, and the third volume offers Kangle's analysis. There is a more recent translation published and sold only in India by Penguin Books. (Kautilya, *The Arthashastra*, ed. and trans. L. N. Rangarajan, New Delhi, Penguin Books, 1992.) I consciously chose not to use this more recent translation, because Rangarajan rearranged the text drastically and topically in the belief that this would make it easier for "the average reader," and also because Rangarajan admittedly departed from "literary exactness" to help out his imagined, average reader (*ibid.*, pp. 24-25). Two further notes for readers. First, I succeeded in getting the two translations of the *Arthashastra*, and many more books on ancient India, by contacting the import house, South Asia Books (www.southasiabooks.com). Finally, when doing computer searches about Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, one should be aware of much variety in spelling. For example, one should search both "Arthashastra" and "Arthasastra." Moreover, one must search "Kautilya," "Kautalya," "Kautiliya," and "Chanakya," another name for Kautilya.
- ¹⁸ J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as Described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, 2nd rev. ed. Calcutta, Chuckerverty Chatterjee & Co., 1960; K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, "Mauryan Polity," in K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *Age of the Nandas and Mauryas*, New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1996 [1967], pp. 89-90; K. A. Sastri, "India in Early Greek and Latin Literature" in Sastri, *Age of the Nandas and Mauryas*, pp. 81-122; H. C. Raychaudhuri, "Chandragupta and Bindusara," in Sastri, *Age of the Nandas and Mauryas*, p. 135; V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, *The Mauryan Polity*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1993 [1932], p. 373; Radha Kumund Mookerji, *Chandragupta Maurya and His Times*, 4th ed., Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 236-245; Romila Thapar, *Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1997.

- ¹⁹ Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, 2nd. ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 58-59; D. D. Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India in Historical Outline*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1994 [1964], p. 142; Mookerji, *Chandragupta Maurya and His Times*, p. 2.
- ²⁰ Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India*, p. 141.
- ²¹ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 15.1.1, p. 512. Wolpert translates *arthashastra* as the “science of material gain.” (Wolpert, *A New History of India*, p. 57.)
- ²² Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 1.1.1, p. 1.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 15.1.71, p. 516.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.4.26, p. 419.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 15.1.72, p. 516.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.5.17, p. 11.
- ²⁷ Wolpert, *A New History of India*, p. 60. See Romila Thapar, *A History of India*, Baltimore, Penguin Books, pp. 5-6. Ram Sharan Sharma has said accurately that, “Kautilya surpasses the Greek philosophers” in terms of a “full and complete definition of the state,” (Ram Sharan Sharma, *Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India*, 3rd. ed., New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1991, p. 38.) See also Somendra Lal Roy, “Kautilya’s Concept of State,” *Socialist Perspective (India)* vol. 20, nos. 1-2, 1992, pp. 93-99.) Usha Meta and Usha Thakkar point out that Kautilya’s bureaucracy was a professional one chosen by merit, not a system of spoils (Usha Mehta and Usha Thakkar, *Kautilya and His Arthashastra*, New Delhi, S. Chand & Company, 1980, p. 102), whilst U. Goshal comments that Kautilya’s detailed analysis of state administration takes him well beyond Machiavelli in this respect (U. N. Ghoshal, *A History of Hindu Political Theories*, London, Oxford University Press, 1923, p. 155.) N. N. Law observes that Kautilya’s policies - such as irrigation works, highways, waterways, dams, bridges, planting trees and flowers, cultivating medicinal plants, and so on - all amount to a full scale public works program (N. N. Law, *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity*, Bombay, Longmans, Green and Co., 1914, pp. 2-3).
- ²⁸ Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India*, p. 142; Erich Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1993 [1973], p. 216; T. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1993 [1903], p. 270.
- ²⁹ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 1.7.1, p. 13.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.7.60, p. 431.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 4.3.43, p. 265.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 2.1.26, p. 57; 3.20.22; p. 253.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, 14.1.1, p. 494; 14.2.45, p. 502; 14.3.88, p. 509.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.19.34, p. 47.
- ³⁵ Ghoshal, *A History of Hindu Political Theories*, pp. 144-45.

- ³⁶ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 7.5.19-27, p. 335.
- ³⁷ For Machiavelli's expansionism, see Mark Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 3-30.
- ³⁸ Machiavelli, *The History of Florence*, in Gilbert, *The Chief Works*, 2.1, p. 1081.
- ³⁹ Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 2.2, p. 329.
- ⁴⁰ Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, 2.12, p. 1094.
- ⁴¹ Herman Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India*, Calcutta, Rupa & Co., 1991, pp. 35-41.
- ⁴² Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 1.3.5-8; pp. 7-8; A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India*, New York, Hawthorn Press, 2nd. ed., 1963, pp. 217-18; Thapar, *History of India*, pp. 76-77. "Probably the main body of the sudra population continued to be employed as agricultural labourers and slaves." (R. S. Sharma, *Sudras in Ancient India*, 3rd. ed., New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1990, p. 165.)
- ⁴³ Basham, *The Wonder that Was India*, pp. 148-49.
- ⁴⁴ *Bhagavad Gita*, trans. Juan Mascaró, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1962, bk 3, line 35, p. 59. Charles Drekmeier rightly maintains that Kautilya "never denies that the ultimate purpose of the state is a moral purpose, the maintenance of *dharma* [doing one's duty, right conduct]." Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962, p. 201.
- ⁴⁵ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 1.3.16, p. 9.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.1.38, p. 194.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.3.14, p. 8.
- ⁴⁸ Sharma, *Aspects of Political Ideas and Institutions in Ancient India*, pp. 253-63. G. Bhagat offers a contrary view. "Kautilya never recommended religion as a tool for politics." G. Bhagat, "Kautilya Revisited and Revisioned," *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 51, no. 2, 1990, 186-212, p. 190.
- ⁴⁹ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 3.1.44, p. 195.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ Sastri supports this claim. "[Kautilya's] view of the supremacy of the royal decree is exceptional among Indian writers." (Sastri, *Age of the Nandas and Mauryas*, p. 174) For a contrary view, see U. N. Ghoshal, "The Authority of the King in Kautilya's Political Thought." *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 4, 1952, pp. 307-11.
- ⁵² Machiavelli, *Letters*, in Gilbert, *The Chief Works*, p. 1010.
- ⁵³ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 6.1.18, p. 317.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.1.9, p. 406.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.1.41-43, p. 195.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.4.62, p. 491.

- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.1.18, p. 407.
- ⁵⁸ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, p. 407, footnote by Kangle; see also, V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, *War in Ancient India*, 2nd. ed., Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1987 [1948], pp. 38-39; Raychaudhuri, "Chandragupta and Bindusara," p. 156; L. K. Mahapatra, "Kingship in India and Southeast Asia: A Field of Transcultural Interaction," *Journal of the Indian Anthropological Society*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1995, pp. 201-15; Indra, *Ideologies of War and Peace in Ancient India*, Hoshiapur, Vishveshvaranand Institute Publications, 1957, p. 55.
- ⁵⁹ John W. Spellman, *Political Theory of Ancient India*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 173.
- ⁶⁰ Narasingha Prosad Sil, "Political Morality Vs. Political Necessity: Kautilya and Machiavelli Revisited," *Journal of Asian History*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1985, pp. 101-42, p. 123.
- ⁶¹ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 1.9.1-15, pp. 18-20.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, 4.13.33, p. 290.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, 1.13.1, p. 28; see also, *ibid.*, 1.12.6, pp. 24-25.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.4.3, p. 265.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.4.9-10, p. 468.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.13.19,20-21, p. 29.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.5.14,18, p. 268.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.36.1-2, p. 185; 2.35.1-2, p. 182.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.25.12, p. 154; 2.35.13, p. 184; 2.36.9-10, p. 185.
- ⁷⁰ Machiavelli, *Art of War*, p. 719; Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, 5, 27, pp. 1269-1270; Boesche, *Theories of Tyranny*, pp. 95-97.
- ⁷¹ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 4.6.1-2, pp. 268-69.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 4.8.4, p. 274; 4.8.14, p. 275.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 4.8.21-22, p. 276.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.8.25, p. 277.
- ⁷⁵ For examples, see Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, 3, 14, p. 1162, and 7, 17, p. 1359.
- ⁷⁶ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 1.21.1-29, pp. 52-54.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.1.1,4, p. 292.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.1.15-18, 21-22, 23-27, pp. 293-94.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.1.57, p. 296.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.1.1, p. 494.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 7.16.26, p. 374.
- ⁸² Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 63.
- ⁸³ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, 1.18.16, pp. 44-45.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.17.5, p. 39.

- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.6.17, p. 339.
- ⁸⁶ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 114.
- ⁸⁷ See, for examples, Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, 3, 28, p. 1184; 4, 29, p. 1223; 6, 7, p. 1292; 6, 9, p. 1295.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 8, 1-9, pp. 1381-1385.
- ⁸⁹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 31.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.
- ⁹¹ Aristotle, *The Athenian Constitution*, trans. J. Rhodes, New York, Penguin, 1984, ch. 14; Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Julian Barnes, 2 vols., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, 1284a29-31.
- ⁹² Tacitus, *The Annals of Imperial Rome*, trans. Michael Grant, rev. ed., New York, Penguin, 1977, 1.7.
- ⁹³ Machiavelli, *Letters*, p. 142.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- ⁹⁵ Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I, 58, p. 316.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 4, p. 201.
- ⁹⁷ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 36.
- ⁹⁸ Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, 2,1, p. 1081; Machiavelli, *Art of War*, p. 568. I cannot agree with Steven Forde who suggests that Machiavelli defended imperial expansion only because it was necessary for self-defense. Trying to remake Machiavelli into a moralist who was forced to do 'bad' deeds doesn't help us understand him. See Steven Forde, "Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli," *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 54, no. 2, 1992, pp. 372-93, and Steven Forde, "International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 39, no. 2, 1995, pp. 141-60.
- ⁹⁹ Machiavelli, *Art of War*, p. 726.
- ¹⁰⁰ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, p. 77.
- ¹⁰¹ Machiavelli, *Art of War*, p. 622.

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